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INSURANCE-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ROBERT W. STURDIVANT*

LiALiry IxSURANCE

In Pennsylvania, etc. Ins. Co. v. Homer,' it appeared that Homer
had struck a parked vehicle but failed to stop. His identity was later
established and he signed a statement admitting that the accident was
his fault and assuming all responsibility in connection therewith, including damage to the vehicle and hospital and medical treatment to
any person suffering injuries as a result of the accident. It was not
until five months after the collision that Homer's insuror received
any notice of the accident. The insuror thereupon filed this action in
the chancery court for declaratory judgment to determine its rights
and liabilities under the policy issued to Homer. The Supreme Court
followed the case of Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co.2
in holding that the giving of notice as soon as practicable as required
by the policy was a condition precedent to liability and that the
delay of five months constituted a breach of this requirement, regardless of whether the insuror showed any prejudice from the delay.3
A similar result was reached in a recent federal case involving a delay
4
of eight months.
The case of Virginia Surety Co. v. Knoxville Transit Lines, Inc.5
is rather singular in that it involved a controversy over the proper
premium charge on a fleet liability policy. The case involved essentially questions of fact and of interpretation of provisions of the
premium endorsements but presented one question of law of interest.
The premium endorsements provided for the calculation of premiums
on a retrospective or experience basis, and although the endorsements
had been attached to the policy, the rates therein set out had not been
filed with the Commissioner of Insurance, as required by law. Tennessee statutes provide that insurance rates shall be fair, reasonable,
adequate and not unfairly discriminatory, and every insuror is required to file with the Commissioner full information as to its rates
or rate plans. 6 It is made unlawful for any insuror to make or issue
a contract or policy except in accordance with the rates which have
*Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue & Sturdivant,
Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 198 Tenn. 445, 281 S.W.2d 44 (1955), 24 TENN. L. REv. 607 (1956).
2. 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S.W. 128 (1918).
3. This holding is in accord with Rural Educational Ass'n, Inc. v. American

Fire & Cas. Co., 207 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1953), discussed in Sturdivant, Insurance

-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 851 (1954).

4. Todd v. National Surety Corp., 226 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1955).

5. 135 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-601 to -616 (1956).
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been filed and approved; and violation of the act subjects the insuror
to a penalty in the sum of $500 to be recovered in a civil action brought
by the Commissioner.7 The Commissioner is given the authority to
abate such part of the penalty as the facts justify and is also authorized
to suspend the license of any insuror failing to comply with his order.
It was urged that the failure on the part of the insuror to file and have
approved the rates set out in the endorsement invalidated the endorsement so that no premium was owed thereunder. The insured by
cross-bill sought a recovery of the premiums that had been paid
under the endorsement. The court, noting that there was no Tennessee
case on the point, concluded that the violation of this statute does
not operate to make the contract between the parties illegal and
unenforceable. The court noted the general rule that contracts should
be invaiidated only when necessary to vindicate a sound policy of
law, 8 and observed that if the legislature had intended to make contracts illegal where there had been no compliance with this statute
it could have expressly done so. Since it had not done so, the court
held that the contention of the insured was unsound.
Omnibus Coverage
The scope of coverage afforded by the omnibus clause of automobile
liability insurance policies was considered in a number of cases during the survey period.
In the case of Kirk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,9
the policy contained the usual omnibus clause, covering the owner as
the named insured and any other person while using the vehicle with
the owner's permission. The policy expressly excluded injuries to the
insured or to any member of his family residing in his household.
The insured loaned the vehicle to a third person, and the insured's
wife rode as a passenger in the car while it was being operated by
such third party. As a result of negligence by the operator she received
injuries. After obtaining a judgment against the operator, she sought
to collect the same from the insuror in the present action. Both the
trial court and the Supreme Court held that the policy did not cover
her.
The wife's theory was that the operator became an additional insured by virtue of the omnibus provisions, and that she was not a
member of such operator's household. Accordingly, she contended that
she was within the coverage afforded to him. Relying primarily upon
a Minnesota decision, 0 however, the Supreme Court held that the
7. Id. § 56-615 (1956).

8. Biggs v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 137 Tenn. 598, 195 S.W. 174 (1917).

9. 289 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1956).

10. Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480, 10 N.W.2d 357 (1943).
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policy was merely a contract and that the court must look to the
intent of the parties in construing it. The parties obviously intended
to exclude the named insured and members of his family, and the
provisions creating additional insureds should not be permitted to
change the basic contract of the primary parties.
In three federal cases exclusions relating to employees of the named
insured or of an additional insured were construed. In the first of these,
New v. General Casualty Co." a liability policy had been purchased by
Fowler as the named insured. His employee, Patterson, used the car
with Fowler's permission, and while so using it, Patterson negligently
injured a passenger in the car. This passenger, New, was an employee
of Patterson, but had no relationship of any kind with Fowler. He
obtained judgment against both Patterson and Fowler, and brought
the present action against the insuror to collect the judgment.
The policy contained the standard omnibus clause but expressly
denied coverage for injury to "any employee of the insured." The
insuror contended that since plaintiff was an employee of Patterson,
and since Patterson was an additional "insured" under the omnibus
clause, coverage did not extend to the plaintiff.
Had the named insured, Fowler, not been also a party defendant
to plaintiff's original suit, probably the insuror would have been successful. Plaintiff, however, had obtained judgment not only against
the operator, Patterson, but against Fowler as well, since the vehicle
was being operated on Fowler's business. Accordingly, the district
court held that the insuror must protect the interests not only of Patterson, but also those of Fowler. Plaintiff was not an employee of
Fowler, and accordingly was held entitled to judgment against the
insuror. The court pointed out that the policy was ambiguous in its
terms, and if susceptible to a construction permitting coverage, such
construction would be made.
12
In the case of Patty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
there were similar policy provisions involved. There the named insured, one Knauff, had loaned his truck to one Cunningham for use
by the latter in taking up hay. Cunningham had asked several neighbors, including plaintiff, to assist him, and while so doing plaintiff
received injuries from Cunningham's negligence in operating the
truck. The Insurance policy excluded injuries to "any employee of
the insured," and contained a standard omnibus clause. The district
court directed a verdict for the insuror on the ground that plaintiff
was Cunningham's employee. The court of appeals reversed, however, and held that a jury issue was presented on the facts as to
this issue. Plaintiff had testified that he and many of his neighbors,
11. 133 F. Supp. 955 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
12. 228 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1955).
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including Cunningham, frequently traded services in farm tasks,
and that he was in no way under the control of Cunningham.
The decision is not inconsistent with the New case, supra, since
there was no attempt here to hold the named insured, Knauff. The
ultimate issue was simply one of fact as to the relationship between
the additional insured and the plaintiff; and in view of the testimony
summarized in the opinion, this appeared to be properly a jury
question.
A similar problem of fact as to the relationship of the parties was
presented in Tanner v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. 13 The policy in this case covered the automobile of one
Mike Zarzour, with an omnibus provision. It also provided that a
substitute automobile used by the insured would be covered, when
the primary vehicle was temporarily out of use for repairs. No business vehicle was covered except private passenger cars driven by the
named insured, his wife or servant.
The named insured and his brother each owned restaurants in
different parts of a city. Early in the evening of the day of the accident, Mike Zarzour placed his automobile in a garage for repairs.
He borrowed the automobile of his brother, Louis, and made several
trips on business for his restaurant during the evening. Louis stayed
at Mike's restaurant and tended it during Mike's absence. Upon his
return, Mike asked Louis to drive to Louis' restaurant and bring back
some meat. Louis thereupon drove in his own car to accomplish this
errand, and while so driving had the accident out of which the suit
arose. The proof showed without contradiction that Louis was at no
time an employee or servant of Mike and that he was merely assisting him as a brother; there was testimony that the brothers frequently
accommodated each other in this way and that occasionally each
loaned his car to the other.
The district court dismissed the suit, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The court pointed out that for Louis' car to be covered as
a "substitute automobile" at the time of the accident, the named
insured would have had to have complete control over it, just as he
did the primary vehicle. The proof failed to sustain such a conclusion,
and, as stated, there was no proof of agency or employment. Presumably if the accident had occurred while Mike himself was driving
the automobile, there would have been coverage.
FIRE INSURANCE

There was one state case and one federal case in this field during
the survey period. In Tucker v. American Aviation and General Ins.
13. 226 F.2d 498 (6thCir. 1955).
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Co.,14 the sole question was the effect, if any, of an insurance company's
having given statutory 5 notice to the Commissioner of Insurance of
the cancellation of a certificate of authority previously issued by it
to an agent. The particular agent had written a fire insurance policy
on behalf of the defendant company covering plaintiff's property for
a period of one year. At about the expiration date, the agent purported
to issue a renewal of this policy and was paid a premium therefor.
It appeared, however, that shortly after the initial policy had been
written the insurance company had cancelled his agency and had
complied with the statutory provisions requiring a return of the
certificate of authority to the Insurance Commissioner. It was not
claimed that actual notice of the revocation of authority had been
given the insured but it was argued that he was chargeable with
constructive notice by reason of the filing of the revocation with
the Commissioner. The court concluded tbat as a matter of legislative
intent, it was not contemplated that proceedings under this statute
would be notice to the citizens of the state and accordingly held that
there having been neither actual nor constructive notice of the revocation of the agency, defendant was bound on the loss.
In the federal case of Renner v. Firemans Ins. Co.,16 the insured had
placed a valued fire policy in the amount of $3,000 on a house. The
house had burned and in connection with the proof of loss, the insured first represented to the adjuster that he had paid $5,900 for the
property and the sworn proof of loss showed its value at $5,000. Subsequently, the insured admitted to the adjuster that he had only paid
$1,650 for the property. The insurance company relied on a policy provision that would void the policy in case of any fraud or false swearing
by the insured relative thereto. The court held that there having been
no false representations prior to issuance that the defense involved
the breach of a condition subsequent. The court found that the proof
was insufficient to show actual fraud or misrepresentation and that
at the time the statement was made the liability of the insuror was
already fixed at the policy amount and accordingly judgment was
rendered for the insured.
WORKIVIENS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
Two important cases, each of them presenting questions of first
impression in Tennessee, were reported during the survey period.
In the first of the cases, Wilson v. Van Buren County,17 an employee
was found to have sustained a compensable injury as a result of
14. 198 Tenn. 160, 278 S.W.2d 677 (1955).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-701 (1956).
16. 136 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
17. 198 Tenn. 179, 278 S.W.2d 685 (1955).

1010

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

silicosis. He had suffered some disability during the year 1951, but
it was not until September 20, 1952, that he first learned the nature
of his illness, and on September 29, 1952, he was forced to quit work
because of his condition. One insurance company had carried the
workmen's compensation insurance for the employer through June
15, 1952, and a second insuror had afforded coverage since that time.
The problem in the reported case was to determine which of the
carriers was liable to the petitioner for compensation benefits. The
trial court held that the carrier covering the employee at the date
when he was forced to quit work was liable for the entire amount of
compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon a recent
statute18 which provides that the employer in whose employment
the employee was "last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the
disease" is liable and that the employer's insurance carrier at the
time of such exposure "shall alone be liable therefor," without right
of contribution from any prior employer or carrier.
The court recognized that the statute contemplates a situation
where one employee has worked for several employers over a long
period of time, and that its intent was to fix the liability for compensation upon the last employer. By analogy, however, the court
held that as between a prior and a subsequent insurance carrier
covering the same employer, the insurer having a policy in force
at the time of the employee's last exposure must bear the full
liability.
The court recognized that the foregoing rule might impose some
hardship upon insurance carriers but it was influenced by the very
practical proposition of not requiring an employee to have to determine which insurance carrier would be liable to him. The court also
pointed out that there would be difficult problems of administration
if rules of equitable apportionment among various carriers were
adopted, since it would be extremely difficult to determine the
proportionate amounts which should be contributed by different
carriers.
The second of the two cases, United States Fidelity & GuarantyCo.
v. Elam,19 involved a determination of the rights of a compensation
carrier to recover excess medical payments made by it to an injured
employee. The practice of providing for the payment of medical
expenses and hospital bills for injured employees above and beyond
the rather small limits fixed by the compensation statute2 0 has become
rather widespread and is, of course, highly desirable. Whether the
carrier having paid such benefits would be entitled by subrogation to
TENN. CODE ANw. § 50-1106 (1956).
19. 198 Tenn. 194, 278 S.W.2d 693 (1955).
20. TENN.CODE AwN. § 50-1004 (1956).

18.
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collect such excess from a third party tortfeasor, however, remained
undecided in Tennessee prior to this case. In a very thorough and
well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court held that the carrier would
be entitled to collect such excess payments from a third party, where
its policy of insurance gave it such right and where the employee
accepted the excess benefits pursuant to the policy.
In the instant case, the policy provided for payment of medical and
hospital expenses to an injured employee up to $10,000, an amount
substantially in excess of the statutory liability of a compensation
carrier. The carrier had paid to the injured employee approximately
$6,300 at the time when the employee executed a compromise settlement of his tort action against a third party,21 whose negligence had
allegedly caused his injuries. Immediately the carrier filed an intervening petition in the tort action, setting out the amount which it
had paid, estimating the amount which it would thereafter be required
to pay, and seeking reimbursement therefor from the third party.
The trial court held the carrier entitled to recover only the actual
compensation benefits which it had paid, together with the statutory
medical benefits.
The policy issued by the carrier to the employer, under which the
excess benefits had been paid, provided that the insuror should be
subrogated "to the extent of such payment, to all rights of recovery
therefor, vested by law either in this Employer, or in any employee.
. . .,,22
It was stipulated that the employee had accepted the benefits
under this policy, although he had entered into no specific contractual
relationship with the insuror.
Recognizing that there is some division of authority upon the
subject,2 the Supreme Court held that sound public policy required
that the carrier be allowed to recover. The court stated that the employer who furnishes a policy providing for such excess benefits is
satisfying a moral obligation, and that the provision of such excess
protection is in accord with the liberal spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act as well as with sound public policy. The court pointed
out that to deny the carrier reimbursement for its excess payments
would result in permitting the injured employee to receive such
benefits and at the same time to receive compensation for his medical
and hospital bills from the third party, resulting in double recovery
for the same injury. The court made clear that the recovery permitted
in this case was not a result of the "legal" subrogation rights afforded
21. The employee under present statutes may receive compensation benefits
without waiving his right to sue a third party, but the employer or his insuror
is given a lien for reimbursement upon any recovery from such third party.
TEm.

CODE ANNx. § 50-914 (1956).

22. 198 Tenn. at 213, 278 S.W.2d at 701.
23. E.g., De Roode v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 52 So. 2d 736 (La. App. 1951).
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.the carrier under the compensation statutes, 24 but resulted from the
contractual rights contained in the policy of insurance. Since the
employee was a third party beneficiary of the policy, he was bound
by the subrogation provisions contained in the contract.
HEALTH, ACCIDENT AND DISABILITY INSURANCE

In Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 25 the insuror had issued to
the plaintiff an accident and health policy which provided, among
other benefits, a benefit of $500.00 for the complete and permanent
loss of use of one foot. Plaintiff alleged the permanent paralysis of
her right foot from traumatic arthritis which ensued from an injury
sustained after the policy was issued. The defendant pleaded fraud
based on the plaintiff's statements in the application for the insurance
that she had not had certain diseases, including paralysis, and had
not been confined in a hospital for treatment. Defendant introduced
proof of three hospital confinements prior to the application for a
psychoneurotic condition manifested by a temporary paralysis of the
right leg and other symptoms. The plaintiff, a woman of limited
education, testified that she had not read the application and had not
been asked the questions with respect to paralysis or prior hospital
treatment. Her testimony was not contradicted by defendant's agent.
Plaintiff also testified that she had suffered a fall which resulted in
the paralysis. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably find,
as it did, that the plaintiff did not willfully and fraudulently mislead
the defendant, and that the loss had resulted from the fall she suffered.
The defendant also contended on appeal that it should have had a
directed verdict in that the application contained material misrepresentations. The court held that there was no proof of such misrepresentations in the record, since the application had not been attached
to or made a part of the policy and had been admitted in evidence,
upon plaintiff's objection, only for the purpose of showing fraud in
the procurement of the policy. The trial judge's ruling on admitting
the application for this limited purpose only was approved in view
of a policy provision that "no statement made by applicant for insurance not included herein shall avoid the policy or be used in any legal
proceeding hereunder." Since the application was not made part of
the policy, statements contained therein could not be relied upon to
avoid liability on the policy.
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (1956).
25. 281 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

